Partisan Ambivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and Divided Government

Kenneth Mulligan
Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Despite recent periods of unified party control of government in Washington, DC, divided government has been the norm in recent decades. Scholars agree that when both presidential and congressional candidates are on the ballot the driving force behind divided government at the national level is split-ticket voting. In this study, I present a new psychological model of split-ticket voting. I posit that ticket splitting is motivated by ambivalence over the two major political parties. I test this partisan ambivalence explanation on split ticket votes between president and Congress nationally between 1988 and 2004 and voting for state executive offices in Ohio in 1998. I find that partisan ambivalence predicts ticket splitting at both the national and state levels and does so about as well as some other explanations. The results of this study suggest that divided government occurs, in part, because voters are divided within themselves.

KEY WORDS: ambivalence, voting, split ticket voting, cross pressures

Although the Democrats have held the reins of power in Washington of late, the norm for more than half a century has been divided government, where control of the House, Senate, and presidency is split between the two major political parties. Fourteen of the past twenty-one congressional elections and seven of the past eleven presidential elections have resulted in divided government. In presidential election years, scholars agree that divided government is driven largely by split-ticket voting, where citizens, voting for president and Congress, split their ballots between candidates of the two parties. Ticket splitting and divided government have also been common in state legislatures and in the “plural executive,” where voters split their ballots between state executive officers, such as the governor and attorney general, of different parties (Beck, Baum, Clausen, & Smith, 1992; Key, 1956).
The prevalence of divided government has made its primary cause, split-ticket voting, one of the most often analyzed topics in the study of American political behavior. While several theories of ticket splitting have been proposed, most are limited in their explanatory power because they apply to a particular electoral circumstance, set of offices, or level of government. Relatively few explanations are applicable across a variety of electoral circumstances, and even fewer focus on the psychology of the voter who casts a split ticket. In this study, I present a new explanation of split-ticket voting and its consequence, divided government. Dealing specifically with the American context, I argue that people who have mixed feelings and beliefs about the Democratic and Republican parties—that is, citizens who are ambivalent about the two major parties—are more likely to split their ballots when voting for different offices. As I discuss below, my partisan ambivalence model is grounded in the classic “cross pressures” theory of political behavior (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944) and applicable across contexts. In the next section, I discuss the cross pressures theory of voting as applied to ticket splitting by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes in *The American Voter* (1960). From this I derive my hypothesis that ambivalence over the parties leads voters to split their ballots between Democratic and Republican candidates. I discuss alternative explanations of ticket splitting as developed in the extensive literature on the topic. Following this, using data from the American National Election Study (ANES), I investigate the prevalence of partisan ambivalence and ticket splitting over the past half century. Then I test my partisan ambivalence explanation in three ways: on ticket splitting between votes for president and the House of Representatives between 1988 and 2004, ticket splitting between president and Senate over the same period, and among state executive offices (governor, attorney general, etc.) in Ohio in 1998. In each case I control, where possible, for alternative explanations of ticket splitting. Across all three contexts the results show that partisan ambivalence predicts split-ticket voting and does so about as well as some, but not other, prominent explanations. I also test three potential mechanisms through which partisan ambivalence affects ticket splitting. In the final section I discuss the implications of this study. These implications suggest that voters who are divided within themselves split their ballots between the parties. In doing so, they implicitly cast their lot with divided government.

**The “Cross-Pressures” Theory of Split-ticket voting**

In their pioneering research on voting behavior, Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at Columbia University posited that voters are often torn over the partisan implications of conflicting social identities (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). They suggested that the voter who identifies as Roman Catholic feels more social pressure to support the Democrats but if he or she lives in rural area, then the voter faces social pressures to vote Republican. Such cross pressured voters are “attracted to each party by
one set of opinions and repelled by another” which leads to “conflict within the individual” (Berelson et al., 1954, pp. 190, 200). These voters, the Columbia scholars suggested, have “opinions or views simultaneously supporting different sides” and thus “a foot in each camp.”

The authors of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960; see especially Campbell & Miller, 1957) self-consciously applied the cross-pressures theory to the study of split-ticket voting. They suggested that there are two types of ticket splitters—“indifferent” and “motivated.” The indifferent ticket splitter casts the voting equivalent of a nonattitude. He or she “makes his selections among the candidates on a capricious, quasi-random basis” and in doing so “is very likely to split his ballot” (Campbell & Miller, 1957, p. 300). The motivated ticket-splitter, in contrast, faces “attitudinal cross-pressures” that cause the voter “to experience some conflict in preparing his voting act” (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 81). The cross-pressed voter “tends to try to satisfy both components of the conflict by supporting candidates from both parties...His split ticket,” they suggested, “is a compromise solution to his conflict” (pp. 311–312).

Using data from the 1956 American National Election Study, they measured partisan cross-pressures as a function of the partisan consistency of voters’ political attitudes. Voters whose attitudes were consistently in a Democratic or Republican direction (e.g., pro-Democratic and anti-Republican) they deemed consistent, while those whose views included a mix of “pro” and “con” attitudes toward both parties they suggested “exhibit some degree of conflict of partisan attitude” (p. 81). Plotting their measure of partisan attitude against ticket splitting, they concluded that “the person who experiences some degree of conflict tends to cast his vote for President with substantially less enthusiasm [and] is much more prone to split his ticket in voting for other offices... than is the person whose partisan feelings are entirely consistent” (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 83).

**Partisan Ambivalence and Split-ticket voting**

The notion of partisan cross-pressures finds a contemporary analogue in the study of partisan ambivalence. Ambivalence occurs when a person has conflicting feelings and beliefs about something (Hochschild, 1981; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). For the person who is ambivalent, some considerations about the attitude object are positive, which would imply a positive summary evaluation of the object. Others are negative, implying a negative attitude. These inconsistent implications pull the individual in two directions at once, making a summary expression of an ambivalent attitude unreliable in the sense of being more tentative, weakly rooted, easy changed, and unpredictable than nonambivalent attitudes (Alvarez & Brehm, 1995; Craig & Martinez, 2005; Lavine, 2001).

Applied to attitudes about the two major political parties in the United States, partisan ambivalence is evident when a person has mixed views of the parties. It may arise from any number of sources. It may be based on policy opinions, where a voter
agrees with the Democratic Party on certain economic issues, but with the Republicans on social issues. Like cross pressures, it may be based on religious, regional, or social-group affiliations, such as where an African American feels an affinity for the Democratic party by virtue of his race, but whose Christian Evangelical identity pulls him toward the Republican party. Or it may be based on a combination of these or other factors, together which result in ambivalence about the parties.

The present study is less concerned with the nature of partisan ambivalence than with its implications for split-ticket voting. Only a few published studies have looked at the consequences of partisan ambivalence for political opinions and voting behavior. Greene (2005) finds that voters who are ambivalent about their professed party show less support for the party, its presidential candidate, and are less active politically on the party’s behalf. Basinger and Lavine’s (2005) analysis of ANES data suggests that partisan ambivalence is common, with about 30% of voters having ambivalent partisan attitudes between 1990 and 2000. Studying voting for members of the House of Representatives, they argue that partisans who are not ambivalent can simply vote their party and, assuming the candidate is typical, feel reasonably confident that the choice reflects their preferences. Voters who are ambivalent about the parties, however, do not have the heuristic of party identification to fall back on. In order to cast a vote that reflects their ambivalent point of view, they must turn to alternative sources of information. These authors show that ambivalent voters who are knowledgeable about politics turn to ideology, while those who are low in political information cast their congressional votes based on perceptions of the economy (see also Lavine, Parker-S., & Steenbergen, 2005).

One thing that these and most other studies of ambivalence have in common is that they look at the consequences of ambivalence for a particular attitude object, such as an issue or a candidate, in isolation. In the case of voting, they model vote choice in a single race, looking at the effects of ambivalence on the decision to vote for the Democratic or Republican candidate. There is nothing inherently wrong with this—indeed these are studies of ambivalence about particular issues and voting in a single type of election. However, for the study of ambivalence, this focus on a single electoral contest has important implications for our understanding of the effects of partisan ambivalence on electoral behavior. The problem with looking at a single contest in isolation is that it cannot account for how I suggest ambivalent voters navigate the ballot. Consider the task faced by citizens in the voting booth. In most elections, they confront a number of contests, at least some of which are partisan races—elections in which the candidates are labeled as Democrats and Republicans. For voters whose partisan allegiances are not ambivalent, these party labels make the voting task easier, as these citizens can vote the party heuristic. But as Basinger and Lavine have shown, the party label is less than helpful for ambivalent partisans, who must use other means to cast a vote that adequately reflects their preferences. Ambivalent partisans cannot simply “vote the party” because their party considerations are not consistent. They must turn to alternative sources of information. What information might they be expected to use?
Partisan Ambivalence

I suggest that one source of information they can use is the ballot itself. Ambivalent partisans might deal with this problem by *not* taking each partisan election contest one at a time, but instead implicitly considering two or more races at once. They can actualize their positive views of the Democratic party by voting for the Democratic candidate for Congress while, at the same time, give voice to their likes about the Republican party by voting for the Republican candidate for president. The two contests are not taken up in isolation. A vote for one is conditional on the vote for the other. In this way, voters high in partisan ambivalence use the ballot to solve their voting dilemma. Ambivalent partisans cast a divided ballot that reflects their divided party considerations. To the extent this is occurs, we would expect voters high in partisan ambivalence would split their tickets between candidates for the two parties.

Only one published study has touched on the potential consequences of partisan ambivalence for split-ticket voting. This study, an analysis of ambivalence over group attachments by Lavine & Steenbergen (2005), regressed ticket splitting in the 2000 presidential and House elections on several ambivalence variables. Although partisan ambivalence did not achieve statistical significance in their analysis, their study was not intended as a test of the effects of partisan ambivalence on ticket splitting, as it included a number of variables that are likely causal mediators of its effects, and they not did control for prominent alternative explanations of casting a split ballot. Since the present study is focused on the consequences of partisan ambivalence in particular, I hope to provide a more direct test of its effects on ticket splitting. In the next section I discuss the most prominent alternative explanations of split-ticket voting. Drawing from Campbell and his colleagues’ (1957, 1960) distinction between different types of ticket splitters, in this section I differentiate between “motivated” and “unmotivated” theories of ticket splitting.

Motivated Explanations of Ticket Splitting

One set of explanations suggests that ticket splitting is motivated in the sense that some underlying impetus within the voter drives both votes toward a split ballot. My partisan ambivalence explanation is one such motivated hypothesis. The three most prominent alternative motivated explanations suggest that ticket splitting is driven by weak partisanship, a conscious desire for divided government, or a desire to balance the parties ideologically. The weak partisanship explanation notes that the decline of party identification through the 1980s coincided with the rise of split-ticket voting and divided government at the national level over the same period (Fiorina, 1996). Studies have shown a negative association between partisanship and ticket splitting at the individual level: As partisan strength increases, ticket splitting decreases (Beck et al., 1992; Burden & Kimball, 2002; Roscoe, 2003; Soss & Canon, 1995). These studies indicate that political independents and people who are only weakly attached to their party are more likely than strong partisans to split their ballots.
A second motivated explanation suggests that voters split their tickets out of a conscious desire to create divided government. Support for this supposition comes from mass-sample surveys which typically show most Americans favor divided government in the abstract. The idea that citizens are “cognitive Madisonians” is on solid theoretical ground but the empirical evidence linking a desire for divided government to ticket splitting is disputed (Carsey & Layman, 2004; Garand & Lichtl, 2000; Lacy, 1998; Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2004; Sigelman, Wahlbeck, & Buell, 1997; Smith, Brown, Bruce, & Overby, 1999).

A third motivated explanation suggests that voters split their ballots to balance the parties ideologically (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995; Ingberman & Villani, 1993; Mebane, 2000; Smith et al., 1999). This theory, most often associated with Fiorina (1996), suggests that ideologically moderate voters prefer moderate government and seek to produce it by splitting their ballots between Democratic and Republican candidates. Integral to the model is the perception that the parties are polarized ideologically. Fiorina theorizes that when the parties are relatively close, near the center of gravity of the electorate, ticket-splitting declines. When the parties move away from each other, following their own internal dynamics toward the extremes of the voter distribution, they open up a large policy range in which ticket-splitting is the voter response. (1996, p. 81)

According to this party balancing explanation, ticket splitting increases as the voter perceives himself or herself as between the parties ideologically and the parties themselves as ideologically polarized.¹

The party-balancing explanation is similar to my partisan ambivalence model in that both posit that voters split their tickets out of divided party loyalties. But the two explanations are different in one key respect: Partisan ambivalence provides a broader, more general, framework than that of party balancing, for the following reason. Party balancing is based on the voter’s rational calculation of his or her ideological position relative to those of the parties. Where the voter perceives the parties as ideologically polarized, and himself as ideologically extreme, the citizen casts a straight ticket for the party on his side of the ideological spectrum. If the voter sees the parties as ideologically centrist, however, and himself as similarly moderate, then a split ticket becomes more likely, because there is no ideological reason to vote solely for one party or the other. Partisan ambivalence is broader because it is based on inconsistent feelings and beliefs, and these considerations may be derived from ideological considerations, as in party balancing, or they may also be based on any number of nonideological perceptions, beliefs, or feelings.

¹ Some scholars label this model “policy balancing” rather than party balancing. However, Smith et al. (1999) argue that “the act of ‘policy balancing’ implies that individual voters ultimately engage in ‘party balancing’ ” (p. 738, emphasis in original). Research in the field uses both terms to reflect the same underlying party (policy) balancing construct (Niemi & Weisberg, 2005).
Partisan Ambivalence

such as those related to the groups represented by the parties, the parties’ candidates, their leadership qualities, trustworthiness, popularity, experience governing, etc. Where party balancing implies ideological balancing, partisan ambivalence suggests that voters may also balance many types of considerations.

Unmotivated Explanations

A second set of explanations suggests that ticket splitting is unmotivated or accidental in the sense that it arises from context or circumstances outside the voter or sources within the voter that make voting for president independent of voting for Congress. The three most prominent unmotivated explanations suggest that ticket splitting is driven by uncertainty about the candidates, electoral context, and characteristics of the candidates and the offices they seek. Scholars have long been aware that political candidates sometimes find it in their interest to cloak, shade, or otherwise obfuscate their positions on issues (Key, 1966). When this occurs it can make it difficult for voters to learn where candidates stand on issues and, in consequence, to cast an informed vote. Presumably uncertainty is reduced as citizens become highly aware or knowledgeable about politics (Burden, 2002; Downs, 1957). The electoral context includes regional differences in ticket splitting. Until recently, voters in southern states often cast their electoral college votes for Republican presidential candidates and their House votes for Democratic candidates. As a result, southern voters are more likely to split their tickets (Burden & Kimball, 1998; Frymer, 1994; Frymer, Kim, & Bimes, 1997). The electoral context also includes electoral rules such as the separation of powers, staggered terms of office, and the Australian ballot, each of which make split-ticket voting and divided government possible. One electoral rule shown to be associated with ticket splitting is the straight-party ballot. States that allow voters to cast all their votes for candidates of the same party in a single stroke have less split-ticket voting than states that have the office block ballot, where voters must cast a separate vote for each office (Burden & Kimball, 2002; Campbell & Miller, 1957). In states that have it, the office block ballot makes ticket splitting possible, perhaps even likely.

A third unmotivated explanation involves candidates and the offices they run for. Candidates who outspend their opponents are more visible to voters and better able to attract voters from the other party, leading to split tickets (Beck et al., 1992; Burden & Kimball, 2002; Roscoe, 2003). In voting for president and Congress, citizens are more likely to cross party lines and split their ballots in open-seat congressional races (Mattei & Howes, 2000) and to vote for an incumbent member of Congress (Born, 2000; Burden & Kimball, 2002; Mattei & Howes, 2000; Nicholson, 2005; see also Roscoe, 2003).

While incumbency and seat vacancy are associated with the rise of ticket splitting in voting for president and Congress, Fiorina (1991) emphasizes that these factors cannot explain the concomitant rise of ticket splitting and divided representation in the states. This is about more than mere replication across different levels
of government, Fiorina (1996) shows, because it indicates that some more general and unexplored explanation, one that cuts across levels of government and not captured by institution-specific factors associated with ticket splitting between the president and Congress, is at work. Where possible in the empirical analysis below, I control for each of these predictors of split-ticket voting.

Ticket Splitting and Partisan Ambivalence over Time

Before turning to this analysis, I examine the prevalence of ticket splitting between votes for president and the House of Representatives and also the dynamics of partisan ambivalence over the past several presidential election cycles. The purpose of this longitudinal descriptive analysis is to provide a general sense of how often this type of ticket splitting occurs, and how much of the electorate experiences partisan ambivalence, before we look at the effects of partisan ambivalence on split-ticket voting. The data come from the ANES. The items necessary to do this analysis are available going back to 1952 and end in 2004. The measure of partisan ambivalence was developed by Basinger and Lavine (2005). It is based on the general ambivalence formula of Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995):

\[
\text{Ambivalence} = \frac{\text{Positive} + \text{Negative}}{2} - |\text{Positive} - \text{Negative}|
\]

The formula models ambivalence as a function of the intensity and similarity of the positive and negative considerations associated with the attitude object. According to the measure, ambivalence increases as the positive and negative considerations are numerous or intense (the first term in the equation) and nearly equally so (the second term). The formula has been widely used to measure ambivalence. Basinger and Lavine (2005) call the Thompson et al. measure "standard practice in political science." They adapt it to partisan ambivalence using the party likes/dislikes items.

Another unmotivated explanation is Jacobson’s (1990) party/institutional expectations model, which sought to explain the prevalence of a Republican president and Democratic Congress prior to the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. Jacobson argued that voters want a strong economy and strong national defense, view these as presidential responsibilities, and Republicans as best able to deliver, and so vote Republican for president. They also want a strong social safety net, view this as the responsibility of Congress, and Democrats as best able to provide it, and so vote Democratic for Congress (See also Petrocik, 1991 and Petrocik & Doherty, 1996 for a slightly different theory). These “contradictory impulses” Jacobson suggests, lead coincidentally to split-ticket voting and divided government. Despite some initial empirical support (Alvarez & Schousen, 1993), this explanation has faced criticism because it cannot account for the reelection of a Democratic president and Republican Congress in 1996 or the switch back to a Republican president and Democratic Congress in 2006 without post hoc changes to the theory (see Jacobson, 2000).

The currently available ANES data from 2008 do not include coding of the open-ended items necessary to calculate the measure of partisan ambivalence. Therefore, in this study, analysis of the 2008 election is excluded.

Methodological studies have differentiated ambivalence conceptually and empirically from other strength-related properties of attitudes such as moderation (the opposite of extremity), certainty,
dislikes questions on the ANES, which they enter into their partisan ambivalence formula as follows:

\[
\text{Partisan Ambivalence} = \frac{\text{Democrat} + \text{Republican}}{2} - |\text{Democrat} - \text{Republican}|, \text{where}
\]

\[
\text{Democrat} = \frac{(\text{Positive}_D + \text{Negative}_R)}{2}, \quad \text{Republican} = \frac{(\text{Positive}_R + \text{Negative}_D)}{2}, \text{and}
\]

Positive\(_D\), Positive\(_R\), Negative\(_D\), and Negative\(_R\) are the number of positive and negative reactions to the Democratic (D) and Republican (R) parties, respectively.\(^5\)

In order to place the index of partisan ambivalence on the same scale as the percentage of voters who split their tickets, which ranges from 0 to 100, the measure of partisan ambivalence is coded in Figure 1 also to range from 0 to 100.

---

\(^5\) The ANES allows respondents to provide up to five likes and five dislikes about both the Democratic and Republican parties. The measure of partisan ambivalence ranges from −2.5 (no ambivalence) to 5 (extremely high ambivalence). In the analysis I recode it, and all the predictors, to range from 0 to 1.
The solid line in Figure 1 shows the percentage of voters who split their tickets when voting for president and the House in the 14 presidential elections over these 52 years. It shows that during the 1950s and 1960s the percentage of voters who split their tickets was fairly low, around 15%. Ticket splitting increased slightly in 1968, spiked upward in 1972, and remained fairly high—at about one-quarter of the electorate—until 1992, when it began trending downward to a range similar to where it was 40 or 50 years ago. Ticket splitting appears to have peaked in the early 1970s and has since been on the decline. The double line in Figure 1 shows the aggregate level of partisan ambivalence over the same period. Partisan ambivalence in the United States has remained fairly constant over the past half century. Consistent with Basinger and Lavine’s finding that about 30% of voters were ambivalent about the parties during the 1990s, the double line in Figure 1 suggests that this is roughly the norm over a longer period. While ticket splitting between president and Congress has waxed and waned, the trend of partisan ambivalence suggests that voters are at least somewhat ambivalent about the parties, and this changes little over time at the aggregate level.

**Ticket Splitting Between Votes for Congress and President**

But does partisan ambivalence increase split-ticket voting? I address this question in votes for Congress and president using the same ANES data. One problem with these data is that the variables necessary to control for alternative explanations are limited to certain years. Most are available since 1988. For this analysis I use data from each of the presidential elections between 1988 and 2004. Two controls are not available in all five of these elections. The measure of preference for divided government was asked in three of the five years (1992, 2000, and 2004), while a reliable index of campaign spending is available only in 2004 for House races. For these two controls I estimate separate models using data from the available years. For the others, which I discuss below, I use data from the five presidential elections between 1988 and 2004.

**Measures of Control Variables**

I account for the motivated explanations by controlling for partisan strength and party balancing. The measure of partisan strength is the traditional ANES party identification scale folded at its midpoint. The measure of party balancing is derived from the formula developed by Carsey and Layman (2004) where

$$\text{Party Balancing} = |R_{ID} - C_{ID}| - \left| R_{ID} - \frac{GOP_{ID} - D_{ID}}{2} \right| , \text{and}$$
Partisan Ambivalence

\[ R_{ID} = \text{respondent’s placement of himself or herself on the liberal-conservative ideological spectrum}, \]
\[ D_{ID} = \text{respondent’s placement of the Democratic party on the ideological spectrum}, \]
\[ \text{GOP}_{ID} = \text{respondent’s placement of the Republican party on the ideological spectrum}, \]
\[ C_{ID} = \text{the value of either } D_{ID} \text{ or } \text{GOP}_{ID} \text{ that is closest to } R_{ID}. \]

Consistent with theory, the formula models party balancing as a function of the perceived ideological polarization of the parties relative to the respondent’s own ideological placement.\(^6\) By this measure, party balancing increases as the voter perceives the parties as highly polarized—say, the Democrats as extremely liberal and the Republicans as extremely conservative—and himself or herself in the middle between them. Likewise, party balancing decreases as the respondent sees the parties as closer to each other ideologically and himself or herself as closer to one party than the other. Party balancing is lowest when the voter views the parties as highly polarized and himself or herself as ideologically extreme, located at the same position as one of the parties at one extreme end of the ideological spectrum.

Among the unmotivated explanations, I control for uncertainty using an index measure of political knowledge. The items included in the political knowledge index are in the appendix. I also include dummy coded indicators of region (South vs. otherwise), ballot format (straight party ballot vs. office block), open congressional seats (open seat vs. otherwise), and whether the congressional race involved an incumbent of the party opposite that of the respondent (opposite party incumbent vs. otherwise). I also control for the year in which the study was in the field. I do this by including dummies for each election year, except 2004, which is the reference category. This will remove any election-year-specific variability and allow me to identify and control for particular election years that had significantly more or less split-ticket voting than in 2004. The wording of all the questionnaire items is listed in the appendix. All the variables in this analysis are coded to range from 0 to 1.

**Votes for House and President**

I model ticket splitting in House/president votes (coded 1 = split ticket, 0 = straight ticket) using logit. The results are presented in the first column of Table 1. The coefficient on partisan ambivalence is positive and statistically

---

\(^6\) Two other measures of party balancing that have been used in published research on this topic include ideological strength and a dummy variable of whether or not the respondent perceives himself or herself as between the parties ideologically. The Carsey and Layman measure used here strikes me as a more accurate empirical reflection of the construct, and less prone to measurement error, than these other two. In this analysis I include this measure of party balancing but exclude separate measures of ideological strength and perceived party polarization because to include them here would be redundant.
significant. This supports the supposition that ambivalence over the parties often increases the likelihood of a split ticket in voting for these two offices. Among the control variables, party balancing, an open-seat congressional race, an incumbent member of Congress (whose partisanship is opposite that of the respondent) and voting in the south increase ticket splitting, while partisan strength and political knowledge diminish it. Each of these effects are consistent with theory. The positive and significant coefficient on the indicator for 1988 suggests that there was more ticket splitting in this election than in 2004.

The results in Table 1 cannot speak to the magnitude of the effect of these factors on split-ticket voting. For this I turn to Table 2, which presents estimated...

Table 1. Split-Ticket Voting (1 = split ticket, 0 = straight ticket)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>House/President (ANES)</th>
<th>Senate/President (ANES)</th>
<th>State Executives (1998 Ohio Poll)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Ambivalence</td>
<td>1.08**</td>
<td>1.88**</td>
<td>1.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.41)</td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>(.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Strength</td>
<td>-1.16**</td>
<td>-.81**</td>
<td>-.89**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Balancing (Nat’l)/Ideological Strength (State)</td>
<td>1.47**</td>
<td>1.35**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-Seat Race</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposite Party Incumbent</td>
<td>1.71**</td>
<td>.89**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straight Party Ballot</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Resides in South</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>-.47**</td>
<td>-.79**</td>
<td>-.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Indicator</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Indicator</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 Indicator</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Indicator</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.37**</td>
<td>-2.35**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests). Logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ohio model predicts a split ticket across five statewide executive offices (Same measure as Beck et al., 1992).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
changes in the predicted probability of casting a split ticket across the range of the statistically significant predictors. In the case of continuous variables, which in this analysis include partisan ambivalence, party balancing, and political knowledge, using the minimum and maximum values may be misleading if there are respondents with unusually high or low values. Therefore, for these measures, rather than the absolute minimum and maximum values, I use the mean of the highest and lowest deciles.7 The first column of Table 2 is the change in the predicted probability of a split ticket in votes for president and House across the range of each variable, holding constant all other variables in the model.8 The first predictor is partisan ambivalence. As it changes from its lowest to highest decile the probability that a voter casts a split ticket increases by .10. The probability of casting a split ticket changes by larger margins for partisan strength, party balancing, an open-seat race, and an opposite party incumbent, and by a similar margin for residing in the south and political knowledge. Clearly a number of factors influence ticket splitting between votes for House and president. Partisan ambivalence is hardly the strongest, but clearly it is one of them.

7 The lowest decile is the first 10% of values and the highest decile is the top 10% of values.
8 The change in the predicted probability of a split ticket assumes, where applicable, a House incumbent of the party opposite that of the respondent, an office block ballot, non-South, and other variables set to their mean.

Table 2. Estimated Change in Predicted Probability of Casting a Split-Ticket Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>House/President (ANES)</th>
<th>Senate/President (ANES)</th>
<th>State Executives (1998 Ohio Poll)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Ambivalence</td>
<td>.10 (.04)</td>
<td>.14 (.03)</td>
<td>.23 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Strength</td>
<td>−.27 (.04)</td>
<td>−.15 (.05)</td>
<td>−.21 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Balancing (Nat’l)/Ideological Strength (State)</td>
<td>.23 (.04)</td>
<td>.17 (.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.10 (.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposite Party Incumbent</td>
<td>.26 (.02)</td>
<td>.12 (.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>−.11 (.06)</td>
<td>−.14 (.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. Changes in predicted probabilities are based on estimates of statistically significant coefficients in Table 1, calculated using Clarify (King et al., 2000; Tomz et al., 2003). Standard errors in parentheses. For partisan ambivalence the change is from the mean of the 1st decile to the tenth decile of the predictor. For partisan strength, the change is from “pure” Independent to strong partisan. Changes in the predicted probability assume, where applicable, a House incumbent of the party opposite that of the respondent, an office block ballot, in which the respondent lives outside of the south, and other variables set to their mean.
Votes for Senate and President

The second column of Table 1 presents the logit model of ticket splitting between votes for U.S. Senate and president.9 Looking at the coefficient on partisan ambivalence, it is again positive and highly statistically significant, indicating that partisan ambivalence enhances the likelihood of a split ticket between these offices. As in the House/president model, the results of the Senate model in column 2 show that strong partisans and people who are highly knowledgeable about public affairs are less likely to split their tickets, while those facing an incumbent of the opposite party, and those high on the index of party balancing, are more likely to do so. In this model, an open-seat race and living in the south are not significant. The estimated changes in the predicted probabilities for this analysis are in the second column of Table 2. Between the lowest and highest deciles of partisan ambivalence the probability of a split ticket increases by .14. This is similar to the estimated changes in probability for all the other significant variables in the model—partisan strength, party balancing, an opposite party incumbent, and political information. Overall, the results of both the House and Senate ticket splitting models support the hypothesis that partisan ambivalence increases ticket splitting. The magnitude of the effect is less than some other significant factors in House/president splitting, and in the same range as the other predictors in Senate/president ticket splitting.

This analysis includes five elections over the course of 16 years. One question that arises is whether the effects of partisan ambivalence varied over this period. I addressed this by estimating additional models that included interaction terms between a mean-centered measure of partisan ambivalence and each of the election year dummy variables. I did this for both House and Senate ticket splitting. In both models, none of the interaction terms were significant. This means that the effects of partisan ambivalence in the elections between 1988 and 2000 were not significantly different from the one in 2004.10 As an additional check on the effects of partisan ambivalence on ticket splitting over time, I estimated two additional models that go back to 1952. These models included interaction terms between mean-centered partisan ambivalence and each of the 13 election-year variables between 1952 and 2000. Here, too, none of the interaction terms in either model achieved statistical significance. The results these models suggest that the effects of partisan ambivalence on ticket splitting over the years is not much different from its effect in 2004.

9 The number of observations in the Senate/president model (1,860) is smaller than that of the House/president model (2,455) because only one-third of Senate seats are voted on in any given presidential election.
10 The results of this analysis, not shown, are available upon request.
Preference for Divided Government and Campaign Spending

A second question is whether the omission of the controls for preference for divided government and campaign spending, discussed at the outset of this analysis, may have affected the results of the House models in Table 1. The measure of preference for divided government, which is available only in 1992, 2000, and 2004, asks whether respondents “think it is better when one party controls both the presidency and Congress [or when] control is split between the Democrats and Republicans?” I estimated logit models for House/president and Senate/president ticket splitting based on these years, controlling for preference for divided government and the other controls. The results are presented in Appendix Table 1. In the House model, the size of the coefficient on partisan ambivalence drops slightly and is marginally significant at $p = .07$. The coefficient on preference for divided government is small but positive and significant at $p = .05$. In the Senate model, the coefficient on partisan ambivalence is increased substantially compared to Table 1 and highly significant, while preference for divided government is not statistically significant. The consequences of preference for divided government for ticket splitting, based on these results, are unclear. Regardless, its effects are of marginal consequence for the influence of partisan ambivalence.

The measure of campaign spending is the ratio of spending between the Democratic and Republican House candidates as developed by Burden and Kimball (1998, 2002). It is available only in the 2004 ANES. Using these data I estimated a logit model of House/president ticket splitting with this control variable and all other controls. Because the measure of campaign spending results in a very large amount of missing data, for this analysis I impute missing values on the predictors using King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve’s (2001) Amelia procedure. The results presented in the third column of Appendix Table 1 show that campaign spending did not significantly affect ticket splitting in this election. The effects of the controls are changed somewhat relative to the results in Table 1, but the coefficient on partisan ambivalence is still significant. In short, controlling for preference for divided government and campaign spending do not appear to alter the effects of partisan ambivalence on ticket splitting.

Testing for Mediators of Ticket Splitting

Thus far I have looked at whether partisan ambivalence affects split-ticket voting and by how much, but I have not addressed empirically the process by which this occurs.

We have seen that partisan ambivalence has a direct effect on ticket splitting: Controlling for other theorized causes, partisan ambivalence significantly

11 Of the 1,211 respondents in the 2004 ANES, 734 (61%) reported voting for both president and the House and casting either a straight or split-ticket vote. The result of the missing data on the predictors is that the 734 respondents who voted for both offices is cut by more than half.
increases the likelihood of a split ballot. However, the effects of partisan ambivalence might also work indirectly, through the “motivated” variables in the models. Ambivalence about the parties may lead people to express a weaker attachment to their party. It may engender a desire for divided government. Or it may reasonably make them want to balance the parties ideologically. Each of which could, in turn, lead to a split ticket vote. If any of these possibilities is true, then one or more of these factors mediate, in part, the effects of partisan ambivalence on ticket splitting. I tested for possible mediation of partisan ambivalence by partisan strength, preference for divided government, and party balancing using Baron and Kenny’s causal steps approach (1986; see also Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998), which is the most widely used method of testing for mediation in the social sciences (MacKinnon Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). The results (not shown) suggest that these three variables—partisan strength, preference for divided government, and party balancing—mediate only about one-fifth of the overall effect of partisan ambivalence on ticket splitting. Moreover, I emphasize that this indirect effect of partisan ambivalence, that occurs through these mediators, is not reflected in the statistically significant coefficients on partisan ambivalence in the first two columns of Table 1. Rather, it is in addition to these direct effects as demonstrated in those models. In terms of process, then, these factors jointly explain a fairly small fraction of the overall influence of partisan ambivalence on split-ticket voting.

Recent research by Keele and Wolak (2008) shows that campaign context can influence ambivalence about political candidates. Although the present study deals with ambivalence about parties rather than people, campaign context may similarly affects partisan ambivalence. If this is true, then partisan ambivalence may itself mediate the effects of the unmotivated variables—an open-seat race, opposite party incumbent, campaign spending, ballot format, and region—on split-ticket voting. I tested for this possibility, again using the Baron and Kenny causal steps approach. One of Baron and Kenny’s steps states that the focal predictors (here, the campaign context variables) must significantly predict the mediator (in this analysis, partisan ambivalence). If this condition is not met, then the supposed intervening variable (partisan ambivalence) does not mediate the predictors (the campaign context variables). In this analysis, in the models for both House/president and Senate/president ticket splitting, three of the context predictors—an open-seat race, an opposite party incumbent, and campaign spending—do not significantly predict partisan ambivalence. For these, partisan ambivalence cannot mediate their effects on ticket splitting. The other three context variables—ballot format, region, and political knowledge—do predict partisan ambivalence. Thus part of the effects of these variables on ticket splitting works through partisan ambivalence. However, the relationship between these variables partisan ambivalence is in each case very small, and thus the indirect effect of these variables

12 The results of the mediation analysis are available upon request.
through partisan ambivalence is also quite small. For the most part, the effects of the campaign context variables in this analysis are direct and not mediated by partisan ambivalence.

Ticket Splitting Among State Executive Offices

Thus far this analysis, like most studies of split-ticket voting, has focused on ticket splitting between votes for president and Congress. In this final analysis of this study, I test the effects of partisan ambivalence on ticket splitting in voting for state offices. This focus on ticket splitting among state executives has at least three benefits. First, any general model of ticket splitting must extend to voting for other offices other than Congress and the president and levels of government other than the national level. This analysis allows me to apply the partisan ambivalence explanation to the state level. One special category of ticket splitting and divided government is unique to the states—the plural executive, where voters elect executive officers of different parties. V.O. Key (1956, pp. 198, 52) noted half a century ago that voters frequently avail themselves of this “ungainly apparatus” of state government that allows for the “frustration of party.” The plural executive is not divided government in the traditional sense but relevant to any study of divided representation to the extent that, as Key suggested, the “anachronistic multiple executive becomes at times a block to effective administration” (p. 198). A second benefit is that focusing on state executives allows us to hold constant the electoral context. Rather than many different House candidates, districts, and campaigns, I can deal with one for each office (Beck et al., 1992). Third, here I can focus on a single branch of government—the executive branch—and “avoid the confounding effects of measuring ticket splitting across offices with vastly different functions and popular expectations” (Beck et al., 1992, p. 917).

The dependent variable is ticket splitting among the five executive offices on the Ohio ballot: governor, secretary of state, attorney general, state auditor, and state treasurer. The ticket splitting variable is again coded as dichotomous, scored 0 if the respondent voted for candidates of the same party in all five contests and 1 if the respondent split his or her ticket, voting for candidates of both parties across the five races. These are the same five offices, from the same state, and with same coding of ticket splitting as used by Beck et al. (1992) in their study of ticket splitting in the 1990 Ohio elections. The data for this analysis come from the November, 1998 Ohio Poll, a representative random-sample survey of Ohio residents.13

The measure of partisan ambivalence is based on questions that asked respondents how well four traits describe each political party and whether the party has ever made the respondent experience four emotions. These items are modeled after

13 The survey, which included telephone interviews with 817 adult residents of the state, was conducted by the Center for Survey Research at Ohio State University following the statewide general election.
the candidate trait and affect questions on the NES, as used in Greene’s (2005) study of partisan ambivalence. Responses to the traits and emotions questions were inserted into the Thomson et al. (1995) ambivalence formula as modified by Basinger and Lavine (2005). As with the likes/dislikes questions on the ANES, respondents who view both parties as having a mix of positive and negative traits and eliciting a mix of positive and negative emotions score higher on partisan ambivalence. Unfortunately, the availability of suitable control variables in this dataset is limited. I am able to control for partisan strength and political knowledge. Like Fiorina (1996) I control for party balancing using a measure of ideological strength (an ideology 7-point scale folded at its midpoint), with the expectation that ideological moderates will engage in party balancing. The wording of these items is listed in the appendix. A measure of preference of divided government is also not available, while measures associated with candidates (opposite party incumbent, open-seat race) campaigns (the spending ratio), and context (region, ballot format) are effectively held constant (Beck et al., 1992) because all respondents live in the same electoral district—the state of Ohio.

The results are presented in column 3 of Table 1. The coefficient on partisan ambivalence is again positive and highly significant. As with ticket splitting between votes for Congress and president, partisan ambivalence increases the likelihood of casting a split ballot across votes for state executives. In terms of the controls, partisan strength is once again negative and significant, while the proxy for party balancing, ideological moderation, is close to 0 and not significant. The predicted probabilities for this analysis are presented in the third column of Table 2. They show that the predicted probability of casting a split ticket between the lowest and highest deciles of partisan ambivalence is increased by .23. The probability of a split ticket decreases by .21 as partisan strength varies from its minimum to maximum values.

Overall, the results of the three models in Table 1 provide consistent evidence that voters who are ambivalent about the parties are more likely to split their ballots. This is true whether citizens are voting for national offices or state executives. Controlling for prominent explanations of split-ticket voting, the results of this study show that partisan ambivalence increases ticket splitting.

Discussion

Divided government is a common feature of American politics at both the national and state levels. Scholars agree that the root of divided party control lies in split-ticket voting. I presented a psychological explanation for ticket splitting—that voters who are ambivalent about the political parties address their split considerations by dividing their ballots between the parties’ candidates. I tested this hypothesis on ticket splitting between House and president, Senate and president, and among state executives. In all three contexts, across two levels of government, the results show that ticket splitting is driven, in part, by partisan
Partisan Ambivalence

ambivalence. As one of the first tests of split-ticket voting to receive empirical support across different offices and levels of government, the partisan ambivalence model provides a general explanation of split-ticket voting that contributes to our understanding of the psychology of vote choice.

The results also have implications for our understanding of partisanship, voting behavior, and divided government in American politics. With respect to partisanship, beginning in the 1970s, scholars noted the growing proportion of Independents in the electorate (e.g., Burnham, 1970) and debated whether the change reflected disaffection with the parties (Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1976) or just indifference (Wattenberg, 1981), and whether support for one party implies opposition to the other party (Green, 1988) or not (Weisberg, 1980). Although partisanship in the electorate appears to be undergoing a resurgence, this and other recent studies of partisan ambivalence suggest that a substantial portion of the electorate is neither disaffected nor indifferent toward the parties but, instead, ambivalent. Future research might address more thoroughly the relationship between party identification and party ambivalence, as well as the role of partisan ambivalence in the changing patterns of partisanship in the United States.

In terms of voting behavior, the results of this study suggest that ticket splitting is motivated in the sense that a vote cast for one office is connected to or conditional on a vote for another office. Basinger and Lavine (2005) showed that partisan ambivalence changes the mix of considerations that voters draw from when casting ballots for congressional candidates. The present study showed that this mix of “pro” and “con” considerations leads to split ballots in both national and state elections. More broadly, the results imply that partisan ambivalence may affect political behavior in other ways, perhaps increasing ballot roll-off or decreasing voter turnout. Future work might address these and other consequences of partisan ambivalence for political behavior.

Finally, the results of this study have implications for our understanding of divided government in U.S. elections. Previous studies have suggested that divided government results from the structure of the ballot, electoral rules, the nature of the candidates, incumbency, campaign spending, weak partisanship, or motivations of voters to moderate policy. While the present study does not necessarily cast doubt on these explanations—most of them were significant in this analysis, and some have stronger effects than partisan ambivalence—it does suggest that previous research has overlooked an important explanation, one that travels well across offices and levels of government: Divided government occurs in part because citizens are divided within themselves.
Appendix

Question Wording and Coding

Note that all the variables in the analyses presented in the tables are coded to range from 0 to 1.

American National Election Studies

Split-Ticket voting. 1 = split ticket, 0 = straight ticket.

Partisan Ambivalence. See text and Basinger and Lavine (2005) for partisan ambivalence formula. Based on responses to the party likes/dislikes questions. “Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic (Republican) party?” “Is there anything in particular that you don’t like about the Democratic (Republican) party?” Respondents provide up to five likes and five dislikes for each party.

Partisan Strength. Traditional party ID 7-point scale folded at its midpoint. Higher values reflect stronger partisanship.

Party Balancing. See text for party balancing formula; see text and Carsey and Layman (2004) for rationale. Based on ideology-placement of respondent, Democratic Party, and Republican Party. “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. . . . Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” Respondents who choose “moderate” or “haven’t thought much about it” are asked “If you had to choose, would you consider yourself a liberal or a conservative?” . . . “Where would you place the Democratic Party on this scale?” . . . “Where would you place the Republican Party on this scale?”

Preference for Divided Government. “Do you think it is better when one party controls both the presidency and Congress, better when control is split between the Democrats and Republicans, or doesn’t it matter?”

Open-Seat Race. 1 = open-seat House race in respondent’s district, 0 = otherwise

Opposite Party Incumbent. 1 = race for House in respondent’s district includes an incumbent of party opposite that of respondent, 0 = otherwise.

Campaign Spending Ratio. See text and Burden and Kimball (1998, 2002) for formula and rationale. Winning House candidate’s campaign spending as a fraction of the total in the contest.

Ballot Format. 1 if respondent voted in one of the 17 states with a straight party ballot in 2000 (2004), 0 = otherwise.

South. 1 if respondent voted in one of the 11 states of the Old Confederacy, 0 = otherwise
Partisan Ambivalence

Political Knowledge. Additive scale of correct responses to 3 questions. 2004:
“Which party is more conservative at national level?” “Now we have a set of
questions concerning various public figures. We want to see how much infor-
mation about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and
the like... Dick Cheney... What job or political office does he now
hold?”... “Tony Blair... What job or political office does he now hold?” 2000:
Trent Lott... William Rehnquist... Tony Blair.

1998 Ohio Poll

Partisan Ambivalence. The traits and emotions questions typically asked in
relation to candidates on the ANES were asked here in relation to both the
Democratic and Republican parties for all respondents and worded as follows.
Party Traits: “I am going to read a list of words and phrases people use to describe
political parties. For each, please tell me whether the word or phrase describes the
party I name extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all. Think about
the... Party. The first word on our list is “strong.” In your opinion, does the word
“strong” describe the... Party extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well
at all?” The other three traits were “moral,” “honest,” and “cares about people like
you.” Party Emotions: “Now we would like to know something about the feelings
you have toward the political parties. I am going to name a party, and I want you
to tell me whether something about that party or something it has done has made
you have certain feelings like “anger” or “pride,” or others I will mention. Think
about the... Party. Now has the... Party—because of the kind of party it is, or
because of something it has done—ever made you feel angry?” The other three
emotions were “hopeful,” “afraid,” and “proud.”

I inserted respondents’ answers to the traits and emotions questions into the
Thomson et al. (1995) ambivalence formula, as modified by Basinger and Lavine
(2005). Because the party traits (strong, moral, honest, and cares) are all positive
adjectives, we coded each as negative if the respondent said the word described the
party “not too well” or “not at all” and positive if the respondent chose “quite well
or “extremely well.”

Partisan Strength. Traditional Party ID 7-point scale folded at its midpoint.
Higher values reflect stronger partisanship.

Ideological Strength. Traditional 7-point liberal—conservative ideology scale
folded at its midpoint. Higher values reflect stronger ideology.

Political Knowledge. Additive scale of correct responses to four questions:
“Which party would you say is more liberal—the Democrats, the Republicans, or
are you not sure?” “Which party had a majority of seats in the U.S. House of
Representatives before the November elections—the Democrats, the Republicans,
or aren’t you sure?” “Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitu-
tional or not? Is it the president, the Congress, or the Supreme Court?” “Do you
happen to know what job or political office is now held by William Rehnquist?”
**Appendix Table 1.** Split-Ticket Voting (1 = split ticket, 0 = straight ticket)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>House/President (ANES)</th>
<th>Senate/President (ANES)</th>
<th>House/President (2004 Only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Ambivalence</td>
<td>1.05†</td>
<td>2.18**</td>
<td>1.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.58)</td>
<td>(.66)</td>
<td>(.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Strength</td>
<td>−1.11***</td>
<td>−.43</td>
<td>−1.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
<td>(.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Balancing (Nat’l)/Ideological Strength (State)</td>
<td>1.66**</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.43)</td>
<td>(.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-Seat Race</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.92*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposite Party Incumbent</td>
<td>1.55**</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.78**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straight Party Ballot</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>−.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Resides in South</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>−.48</td>
<td>−1.06**</td>
<td>−1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td>(.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference for Divided Government</td>
<td>.37*</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Spending Ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Indicator</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Indicator</td>
<td>−.15</td>
<td>−.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−2.68***</td>
<td>−2.73**</td>
<td>−1.89*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.49)</td>
<td>(8.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2$</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1324</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes.** †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests). Logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 2004 model based on multiple imputation of missing values of predictors in Amelia (King et al., 2001).

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I thank Tobin Grant, Phil Habel, David Kimball, Howie Lavine, David Magleby, Scott McClurg, Kathleen McGraw, Steve Nicholson, Marco Steenbergen, and the SIUC Political Science Works in Progress group for helpful comments and suggestions. I thank Drew Seib for research assistance. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Kenneth Mulligan, Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University, Mailcode 4501, Carbondale, IL 62901. E-mail: kmulliga@siu.edu
Partisan Ambivalence

REFERENCES


Partisan Ambivalence


AUTHOR QUERY FORM

Dear Author,

During the preparation of your manuscript for publication, the questions listed below have arisen. Please attend to these matters and return this form with your proof.

Many thanks for your assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Query References</th>
<th>Query</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AUTHOR: Thomson et al. (1995) has not been included in the Reference List, please supply full publication details.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>